The pandemic-stymied Summer Olympics were late July and early August at delta’s apex, so another even bigger hit to Japan’s industry/export-heavy economy seems out of line with the direction.

Where it does match only too well is with another industry/export-heavy bellwether like Germany.

Coronavirus; or “growth scare?”

At first thought, this seems an add pair of questions given how the term itself is quite literal and straightforward. The global economy grows, it pauses perhaps halts and we all wonder if the other side of the “scare” will remain growth or turn to something worse – usually a downturn if not full-blown recession at least somewhere(s) around the world where conditions (especially monetary) are most negative with the highest potential for ugly.

In 2021’s case, meaning 2022, there’s an added dimension before we even begin to assess the critical stages of perhaps rolling over.

Instead, what’s happened is supply and non-economic shipment factors have created the mirage of a recovery from what by volume or quantity is actually even more lackluster in total global trade and production than what I’ve presented here of Chinese imported iron ore.

While some of those things are likely causing some level of constraint, overall in Germany, trade like production is easily pieced together when accounting for non-inflation “inflation” which has infiltrated global supply chains due to separate issues rather than full-blown massive demand explosion.

Beginning with trade by value, in yen terms here, exports from Japan appear at least satisfactory though already nowhere near the same as 2018’s limited reach. And even nominally, export activity is tailing off; in October 2021, exports were valued at only 9.4% more than they had been in October 2020.

The year-over-year nominal change (by value) had been 13% in September, and 26% in August. Even 2-year changes, taking account of base effects, have been stable at around high single-digits.

The only way values would become the deciding factor would be if “inflation” was actually inflation. It isn’t.

By volume, exports from Japan in October were down 2.6% year-over-year, and down nearly 4% when compared to October 2019! Furthermore, no matter the terms of comparison, outbound trade from Japan peaked earlier in the year (March or April, again) and has been weakening ever since.

In other words, the economy never really came back all that much; compared to 2020’s low, only somewhat. Instead, because of the unusual nature of the pandemic creating bottlenecks, a truly uninspiring global comeback was made to appear like a rip-roaring one inflation-y in its appearance.

But now, with a little over a month until 2022, we can see how even as little as the 2020/early 2021 rebound had been, still its best days are almost certainly behind us anyway.

China. Germany. Japan. It isn’t China suffering Chinese problems, or Germany plagued by its own set of supplies, and certainly Japan isn’t a victim of pandemic politics of its own making. We’ve seen this particular trio behave this way before, just a few years ago when the whole world eventually turned out like those rather than the inflation-y recovery confidently guaranteed in especially the US and Europe.

The only difference thus far in 2021 has been the earlier “inflation” which, since it isn’t inflation, only means the shroud of prices eventually drops probably like a hammer. Maybe even a landmine.