by Chapter 5 in the CEPR eBook, November 24, 2021. HTML. From the conclusion: From a macroeconomic perspective, central banks can largely neutralise the consequences of CBDC. What is highly uncertain, however, is whether they would choose to do so – the political risks of ‘Reserves for All’ are first-order. The decision for or against CBDC thus should not only reflect the assessment of economic trade-offs, but also whether societies are confident in their ability to efficiently manage conflicts of interest. If not, and if they fear that the introduction of CBDC could further politicise banking and central banking, then the introduction of CBDC might constitute a risky regime change. It will be interesting to see how different [countries] judge this risk.
Topics:
Dirk Niepelt considers the following as important: Bailout, Bank, Central bank digital currency, Conflict of interest, Contributions, Economics, Lender of last resort, Politics, Research, Reserves for all, Taxpayer
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Chapter 5 in the CEPR eBook, November 24, 2021. HTML.
From the conclusion:
From a macroeconomic perspective, central banks can largely neutralise the consequences of CBDC. What is highly uncertain, however, is whether they would choose to do so – the political risks of ‘Reserves for All’ are first-order. The decision for or against CBDC thus should not only reflect the assessment of economic trade-offs, but also whether societies are confident in their ability to efficiently manage conflicts of interest. If not, and if they fear that the introduction of CBDC could further politicise banking and central banking, then the introduction of CBDC might constitute a risky regime change. It will be interesting to see how different [countries] judge this risk.