by Summary:
Mimeo, January 2019, with Markus Brunnermeier. PDF. We propose a generic model of money and liquidity. We provide sufficient conditions under which a swap of private (inside) against public (outside) money leaves the equilibrium allocation and price system unchanged. We apply the results to Central Bank Digital Currency, the “Chicago Plan,” and the Indian de-monetization experiment.
Topics:
Dirk Niepelt considers the following as important: Central bank digital currency, Chicago plan, Equivalence, Research, Reserves for all
This could be interesting, too:
Mimeo, January 2019, with Markus Brunnermeier. PDF. We propose a generic model of money and liquidity. We provide sufficient conditions under which a swap of private (inside) against public (outside) money leaves the equilibrium allocation and price system unchanged. We apply the results to Central Bank Digital Currency, the “Chicago Plan,” and the Indian de-monetization experiment.
Topics:
Dirk Niepelt considers the following as important: Central bank digital currency, Chicago plan, Equivalence, Research, Reserves for all
This could be interesting, too:
Dirk Niepelt writes Does the US Administration Prohibit the Use of Reserves?
Dirk Niepelt writes “Pricing Liquidity Support: A PLB for Switzerland” (with Cyril Monnet and Remo Taudien), UniBe DP, 2025
Dirk Niepelt writes “Money and Banking with Reserves and CBDC,” JF, 2024
Dirk Niepelt writes Bank of England CBDC Academic Advisory Group
Mimeo, January 2019, with Markus Brunnermeier. PDF.
We propose a generic model of money and liquidity. We provide sufficient conditions under which a swap of private (inside) against public (outside) money leaves the equilibrium allocation and price system unchanged. We apply the results to Central Bank Digital Currency, the “Chicago Plan,” and the Indian de-monetization experiment.