Tag Archives: Fiscal monetary policy interaction

MA course at the University of Bern. Lecture: Monday, 12.15 – 14.00, UniS A027.Session: Tuesday, 12.15 – 14.00, UniS A017, on 5 Mar, 19 Mar, 26 Mar, 16 Apr, 30 Apr, 14 May. Some lecture and session dates may be swapped. Uni Bern’s official course page. Problem sets and solutions can be found here. The course covers macroeconomic theories of fiscal policy (including tax and debt policy) and the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. Participants should be familiar with the...

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, January 25, 2024. PDF. HTML. Kritik an der Höhe der SNB-Ausschüttungen ist somit nur gerechtfertigt, wenn die Finanzverantwortlichen von Bund und Kantonen die genannten Hebel nicht in Bewegung setzen können. Einer solchen Kritik muss sich die SNB stellen. Sie hat die Kompetenz, ihre Bilanz nach geldpolitischen Erfordernissen zu gestalten, aber eine mechanische Rückstellungspolitik entspricht diesem Erfordernis kaum. Die SNB sollte daher begründen, warum eine...

MA course at the University of Bern. Time: Monday, 12.15 – 14.00. Location: UniS, A027. Uni Bern’s official course page. TA: Remo Taudien. This course covers macroeconomic theories of fiscal policy (including tax and debt policy) and the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. Participants should be familiar with the material covered in the course Macroeconomics II. The course grade reflects the final exam grade. The classes follow selected chapters in the textbook Macroeconomic...

In an NBER working paper John Cochrane concludes that … we have been guilty of playing with too-complex models when we don’t really understand basics, such as stability, determinacy, and the frictionless limit. … Given the state of actual agreed-on knowledge, central banks’ proclamations of detailed technocratic ability to manipulate delicate frictions is laughable. Figure 10 shows in chart form the Rube-Goldberg list of mechanisms the ECB thinks it understands and can manipulate....

How are SNB profits and losses distributed and what issues are debated? Annual Result Funds two “Reserves” The annual result (Jahresergebnis) of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) is split into two parts. The first part funds “provisions for currency reserves” (Zuweisungen an Rückstellungen für Währungsreserven) which are meant to provide a buffer against future losses on the SNB’s asset positions. The second part funds current and future profit distributions to the Confederation and cantons...

The Federal Department of Finance and the SNB have agreed on a new scheme for the distribution of SNB profits. Agreement for the period 2020-2025, Explanations. Some comments in German (also available as PDF): Profitieren Bund und Kantone finanziell von den höheren SNB-Ausschüttungen? Höhere Gewinnausschüttungen in der Gegenwart bedingen tiefere in der Zukunft. In erster Näherung bleibt das Nettovermögen von Bund und Kantonen unverändert, denn es berücksichtigt auch den Wert der...

Panel with Elga Bartsch, Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Giancarlo Corsetti, Olivier Garnier, and Charles Wyplosz. Moderated by Tobias Broer. Elga Bartsch, Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Giancarlo Corsetti, Xavier Debrun: Geneva Report 23 | It’s All in the Mix: How Monetary and Fiscal policies Can Work or Fail Together. Event at PSE. My comments on the report.

Dirk Niepelt ist der Direktor des Studienzentrums Gerzensee und Professor für Makroökonomie an der Universität Bern. Hier im Gespräch mit Geldcast-Host Fabio Canetg. swissinfo.ch Swissinfo, December 14, 2020. HTML, podcast. We talk about CBDC, the Swiss National Bank, whether CBDC would render it easier to implement helicopter drops, and how central bank profits should be distributed. Dirk Niepelt ist weltweit einer der führenden Forscher auf dem Gebiet der...

Swissinfo, December 14, 2020. HTML, podcast. We talk about CBDC, the Swiss National Bank, whether CBDC would render it easier to implement helicopter drops, and how central bank profits should be distributed.

Finanz und Wirtschaft, July 25, 2020. PDF. The Swiss National Bank—yes, the Swiss one—feels it must remind politicians of its independence. Parliamentarians from left to right (!) voice demands. To shrink the SNB’s balance sheet? No, for more central bank profits to be distributed sooner rather than later. I discuss misconceptions, possible motivations, and a constructive response. «The best way to defend the independence of a central bank is never to exercise it.»