Tag Archives: Politico-economic equivalence

International Journal of Central Banking. PDF. This paper offers a macroeconomic perspective on the “Reserves for All” (RFA) proposal to let the general public hold electronic central bank money and transact with it. I propose an equivalence result according to which a marginal substitution of outside money (e.g., RFA) for inside money (e.g., deposits) does not affect macroeconomic outcomes. I identify key conditions for equivalence and argue that these conditions likely are...

Journal of Monetary Economics, with Markus Brunnermeier. PDF. When does a swap between private and public money leave the equilibrium allocation and price system unchanged? To answer this question, the paper sets up a generic model of money and liquidity which identifies sources of seignorage rents and liquidity bubbles. We derive sufficient conditions for equivalence and apply them in the context of the “Chicago Plan”, cryptocurrencies, the Indian de-monetization experiment, and Central...

Accepted for publication in the Journal of Monetary Economics, with Markus Brunnermeier. (NBER wp.) When does a swap between private and public money leave the equilibrium allocation and price system unchanged? To answer this question, the paper sets up a generic model of money and liquidity which identifies sources of seignorage rents and liquidity bubbles. We derive sufficient conditions for equivalence and apply them in the context of the “Chicago Plan”, cryptocurrencies, the Indian...

Finanz und Wirtschaft, June 29, 2019. PDF. It is not central bank digital currency (CBDC) per se which might act as a game changer in financial markets. What will be key is how central banks accommodate the introduction of CBDC. In principle, this accommodation can go very far, to the point where the introduction of CBDC does not affect macroeconomic outcomes. But such complete accommodation is unlikely. On the one hand, central banks will want to exploit the new monetary policy options...

Accepted for publication in the International Journal of Central Banking. PDF. This paper offers a macroeconomic perspective on the “Reserves for All” (RFA) proposal to let the general public hold electronic central bank money and transact with it. I propose an equivalence result according to which a marginal substitution of outside money (e.g., RFA) for inside money (e.g., deposits) does not affect macroeconomic outcomes. I identify key conditions for equivalence and argue that these...

Accepted for publication in the International Journal of Central Banking. PDF. This paper offers a macroeconomic perspective on the “Reserves for All” (RFA) proposal to let the general public hold electronic central bank money and transact with it. I propose an equivalence result according to which a marginal substitution of outside money (e.g., RFA) for inside money (e.g., deposits) does not affect macroeconomic outcomes. I identify key conditions for equivalence and argue that these...

December 2018. PDF. In: Ernest Gnan and Donato Masciandaro, editors, Do We Need Central Bank Digital Currency? Economics, Technology and Institutions, SUERF, The European Money and Finance Forum, Vienna, 2018. A short version of the CEPR working paper.

December 2018. PDF. In: Ernest Gnan and Donato Masciandaro, editors, Do We Need Central Bank Digital Currency? Economics, Technology and Institutions, SUERF, The European Money and Finance Forum, Vienna, 2018. A short version of the CEPR working paper.

VoxEU, August 20, 2018. HTML. To a first approximation, inside and outside money are substitutes—the introduction of CBDC does not change the equilibrium allocation. Bank incentives and central bank incentives might be affected though. CBDC could increase the incentive to extend credit but might undermine the political support for implicit financial assistance to banks.

VoxEU, August 20, 2018. HTML. To a first approximation, inside and outside money are substitutes—the introduction of CBDC does not change the equilibrium allocation. Bank incentives and central bank incentives might be affected though. CBDC could increase the incentive to extend credit but might undermine the political support for implicit financial assistance to banks.