Tag Archives: Intermediation

CEPR Discussion Paper 18444, September 2023. HTML (local copy). Abstract: We analyze the role of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) and reserves when banks exert deposit market power and liquidity transformation entails externalities. Optimal monetary architecture minimizes the social costs of liquidity provision and optimal monetary policy follows modified Friedman (1969) rules. Interest rates on reserves and CBDC should differ. Calibrations robustly suggest that CBDC provides...

It was one of those signals which mattered more than the seemingly trivial details surrounding the affair. The name MF Global doesn’t mean very much these days, but for a time in late 2011 it came to represent outright fear. Some were even declaring it the next “Lehman.” While the “bank” did eventually fail, and the implications of it came to be systemic, those overly melodramatic descriptions actually served to downplay the event in public imagination. The world...

The Economist discusses the risk of CBDC-induced bank disintermediation. Their summary of the 2019 paper by Markus Brunnermeier and myself: If people prefer CBDCS, however, the central bank could in effect pass their funds on to banks by lending to them at its policy interest rate. “The issuance of CBDC would simply render the central bank’s implicit lender-of-last-resort guarantee explicit,” wrote Markus Brunnermeier of Princeton University and Dirk Niepelt of Study Centre Gerzensee...

On his blog, John Kay speculates about the future of financial intermediation: The paradox of modern capital markets is that although there is less and less need for market activity from the point of view of either the end users of finance, or the investors who are the ultimate beneficiaries of finance, the volume of market activity has increased exponentially. … The growth of secondary market trading at the expense of an understanding of the underlying exposure led to disaster in the...

On the FT’s Alphaville blog, Izabella Kaminska questions the value of decentralization (and thus, blockchain technology) in intermediation. Decentralisation is, in almost all cases, not an efficiency. To the contrary, it’s a cost that adds complexity and creates an unnecessary burden for both users and operators unless centralised layers are added on top of it — defying the whole point. … At the end of the day, there are only two groups of people prepared to go to costly lengths to...

NZZ, November 29, 2016. HTML, PDF. Central banks are increasingly interested in employing blockchain technologies, and they should be. The blockchain threatens the intermediation business. Central banks encounter the blockchain in the form of new krypto currencies, and as the technology underlying new clearing and settlement systems. Krypto currencies bear the risk of “dollarization,” but in the major currency areas this risk is still small. New clearing and settlement systems benefit...

VoxEU, October 19, 2016. HTML. Central banks are increasingly interested in employing blockchain technologies. The blockchain threatens the intermediation business. Central banks encounter the blockchain in the form of new krypto currencies, and as the technology underlying new clearing and settlement systems. Krypto currencies bear the risk of “dollarization,” but in the major currency areas this risk is still small. New clearing and settlement systems benefit from central bank...

The blockchain technology opens up new possibilities for financial market participants. It allows to get rid of middle men and thus, to save cost, speed up clearing and settlement (possibly lowering capital requirements), protect privacy, avoid operational risks and improve the bargaining position of customers. Internet based technologies have rendered it cheap to collect information and to network. This lies at the foundation of business models in the “sharing economy.” It also lets...