Tag Archives: Contributions

Schweizer Monat, April 2022, with Markus Brunnermeier. PDF. We describe challenges the digital money revolution poses for central banks and predict that more and more monetary authorities will introduce CBDCs.

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, February 17, 2022. PDF. The federal council’s digital finance strategy focuses on regulation. There are limits to this strategy when financial markets operate globally and virtually. Preserving monetary sovereignty requires an attractive national currency. Carrots, not only sticks. An attractive currency is not only stable but also usable in digital form.

CEPR and SUERF webinar moderated by me. Markus Brunnermeier and Jean-Pierre Landau present their report for the European Parliament. Youtube.

CEPR Discussion Paper 16906, January 2022, with Martin Gonzalez-Eiras. PDF (local copy). We investigate how politico-economic factors shaped government responses to the spread of COVID-19. Our simple framework uses epidemiological, economic and politico-economic arguments. Confronting the theory with US state level data we find strong evidence for partisanship even when we control for fundamentals including the electorate’s political views. Moreover, we detect an important role for the...

Wirtschaft Regional, January 7, 2022. PDF. Interview on private and public money, digital payments, Bitcoin, cash.

Wirtschaft Regional, January 7, 2022. PDF. Interview on private and public money, digital payments, Bitcoin, cash.

Riksbank Research News 2021, December 2021. PDF (pp. 2–3), HTML. Q: You have been leader of the CEPR Research and Policy Network on FinTech and Digital Currencies since 2021 and explored issues at the heart of monetary theory and payment systems in your research. What do you think is new about digital central bank money and what makes it different from other digital means of payment? A: Societies have been using digital means of payment for decades. Commercial banks use digital claims...

Finanz und Wirtschaft, December 8, 2021. PDF. I draw some conclusions from the CEPR eBook on CBDC, namely: Banks will change, whatever happens to CBDC. The main risk of retail CBDC is not bank disintermediation. CBDC may not be the best option even if it has net benefits. It should be for parliaments and voters, not central banks, to decide about the introduction of CBDC. [embedded content] You Might Also Like...

Finanz und Wirtschaft, December 8, 2021. PDF. I draw some conclusions from the CEPR eBook on CBDC, namely: Banks will change, whatever happens to CBDC. The main risk of retail CBDC is not bank disintermediation. CBDC may not be the best option even if it has net benefits. It should be for parliaments and voters, not central banks, to decide about the introduction of CBDC.

Chapter 5 in the CEPR eBook, November 24, 2021. HTML. From the conclusion: From a macroeconomic perspective, central banks can largely neutralise the consequences of CBDC. What is highly uncertain, however, is whether they would choose to do so – the political risks of ‘Reserves for All’ are first-order. The decision for or against CBDC thus should not only reflect the assessment of economic trade-offs, but also whether societies are confident in their ability to efficiently manage...