December 2018. PDF. In: Ernest Gnan and Donato Masciandaro, editors, Do We Need Central Bank Digital Currency? Economics, Technology and Institutions, SUERF, The European Money and Finance Forum, Vienna, 2018. A short version of the CEPR working paper.
Read More »“Reserves For All? …” on Several SSRN Top Ten Lists
My July 2018 CEPR working paper “Reserves For All? Central Bank Digital Currency, Deposits, and their (Non)-Equivalence” has made it on several SSRN top ten lists. PDF. (Personal copy.) Abstract: I offer a macroeconomic perspective on the “Reserves for All” (RFA) proposal to let the general public use electronic central bank money. After distinguishing RFA from cryptocurrencies and relating the proposal to discussions about narrow banking and the abolition of cash I propose an equivalence...
Read More »“Reserves For All? …” on Several SSRN Top Ten Lists
My July 2018 CEPR working paper “Reserves For All? Central Bank Digital Currency, Deposits, and their (Non)-Equivalence” has made it on several SSRN top ten lists. PDF. (Personal copy.) Abstract: I offer a macroeconomic perspective on the “Reserves for All” (RFA) proposal to let the general public use electronic central bank money. After distinguishing RFA from cryptocurrencies and relating the proposal to discussions about narrow banking and the abolition of cash I propose an equivalence...
Read More »“Central Bank Digital Currency: Why It Matters and Why Not,” VoxEU, 2018
VoxEU, August 20, 2018. HTML. To a first approximation, inside and outside money are substitutes—the introduction of CBDC does not change the equilibrium allocation. Bank incentives and central bank incentives might be affected though. CBDC could increase the incentive to extend credit but might undermine the political support for implicit financial assistance to banks.
Read More »“Central Bank Digital Currency: Why It Matters and Why Not,” VoxEU, 2018
VoxEU, August 20, 2018. HTML. To a first approximation, inside and outside money are substitutes—the introduction of CBDC does not change the equilibrium allocation. Bank incentives and central bank incentives might be affected though. CBDC could increase the incentive to extend credit but might undermine the political support for implicit financial assistance to banks.
Read More »“Reserves For All? Central Bank Digital Currency, Deposits, and their (Non)-Equivalence,” CEPR, 2018
CEPR Discussion Paper 13065, July 2018. PDF. (Personal copy.) I offer a macroeconomic perspective on the “Reserves for All” (RFA) proposal to let the general public use electronic central bank money. After distinguishing RFA from cryptocurrencies and relating the proposal to discussions about narrow banking and the abolition of cash I propose an equivalence result according to which a marginal substitution of outside for inside money does not affect macroeconomic outcomes. I identify key...
Read More »“Reserves For All? Central Bank Digital Currency, Deposits, and their (Non)-Equivalence,” CEPR, 2018
CEPR Discussion Paper 13065, July 2018. PDF. (Personal copy.) I offer a macroeconomic perspective on the “Reserves for All” (RFA) proposal to let the general public use electronic central bank money. After distinguishing RFA from cryptocurrencies and relating the proposal to discussions about narrow banking and the abolition of cash I propose an equivalence result according to which a marginal substitution of outside for inside money does not affect macroeconomic outcomes. I identify key...
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